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ASSESSING PATIENT
COMPLIANCE IN THE SELECTION
OF ORGAN TRANSPLANT
RECIPIENTS
Ingrid Kinkopf-Zajac*
I. INTRODUCTION
THERE IS A SUBSTANTIAL AMOUNT of literature
addressing many of the issues related to the scarcity of organs
for transplantation. A great deal of this material focuses on
increasing the supply of organs through various means, which
include increasing public education about organ donation, pro-
posals for changing the laws regulating organ donation, and the
role of potential donors, family members, and health care pro-
viders in the organ donation process.
An equally substantial amount of literature focuses on
dealing with the reality of too few organs and the criteria by
which they are rationed. As Table 1 below illustrates, there is a
significant number of people waiting for organs.' Table 2
shows that the rate at which their needs are met is insuffi-
cient.2
* J.D. candidate 1996, Case Western Reserve University School of Law.
1. UNITED NErwoRK FOR ORGAN SHARiNG (UNOS), THm NAT'L ORGAN PROCURMENIr
AND & TRANSPLANTATION NETWORK, FACrS ABoTr TRANSPLANTATION IN THE UNITED STATES
(1995), listing the number of people waiting for organs as of March 2, 1995. "UNOS policies
allow patients to be listed with more than one transplant center (multiple listing), and thus
registrations may be greater than the actual number of patients." Id.
2. Id. These data are based upon the UNOS Scientific Registry as of February 18, 1995
and are "subject to change due to future data submission or correction." Organs for 2550 of these
kidney transplants were provided by living related donors.
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Table 1 - UNOS National Patient Waiting List Registrations
Kidney 27,897
Liver 4,281
Pancreas 238
Pancreas Islet Cell 15
Kidney-Pancreas 1,116
Intestine 73
Heart 3,044
Heart-Lung 207
Lung 1,678
Total 38,549
Table 2 - Number of Transplants Performed, January-November 1994
Kidney 9,539
Liver 3,327
Pancreas 93
Kidney-Pancreas 677
Heart 2,151
Heart-Lung 65
Lung 657
Total 16,509
The current system for the selection of organ recipients
has suffered from a great deal of criticism, particularly in light
of the scarcity of organs. This Note will review the current
process by which candidates for organ transplantation are se-
lected as well as identify problems existing within that pro-
cess.
3
The body of this Note, however, is devoted to recommen-
dations for significant changes in the current process. This in-
cludes the consideration of additional criteria by which trans-
3. The scope of this Note is limited to the discussion of solid organ transplantation (i.e.,
pancreas, liver, heart, kidneys, and lungs). It does not address issues related to other transplantable
human body parts such as bone, cartilage, bone marrow, and corneas because the tranplantation
process of such parts varies significantly from that of solid organs.
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plant candidates could be selected, in addition to addressing
some of the existing problems with the current system. Specifi-
cally, this proposal involves establishing uniform guidelines for
assessing patients' ability or willingness to comply with post-
transplant treatment in the selection of would-be organ recipi-
ents. Such a change employs the use of psychosocial factors in
assessing patient compliance, and as a result, is very controver-
sial because of the necessary value judgments that often ac-
company their use. Although there are commentators who
advocate the use of psychosocial factors in the allocation of
organs, they have not made specific recommendations for their
use. The intent of this Note, therefore, is to take the next step,
that is, to make specific recommendations for changes to the
current system and include the assessment of patient compli-
ance in the selection of organ transplant recipients. It is recom-
mended that this assessment be implemented in all transplant
programs; however, because of the implications of this propos-
al and the unavailability of alternative treatment for some pa-
tients, the exclusion of potential recipients should be limited to
re-transplant patients and potential kidney recipients only.
The use of psychosocial factors in evaluating potential
organ recipients is very unpopular and the arguments against it
are difficult to overcome. Therefore, the advantages and disad-
vantages of such a proposal will be discussed at length. Al-
though the arguments against such a proposal are compelling,
it is believed that this proposal represents a legitimate and
manageable way of dealing with the scarcity of organs avail-
able for transplantation - a reality that has the potential to
touch anyone.4
II. THE ROLE OF PATIENT COMPLIANCE IN THE
CURRENT PROCESS FOR SELECTING ORGAN
TRANSPLANT RECIPIENTS AND UNDERSTANDING
PATIENT COMPLIANCE
Before discussing the current system for selecting organ
4. As of this writing, the author's father had just received his first cadaveric kidney
transplant after being on the waiting list for nearly two years. His kidney failure was caused by
complications of diabetes mellitus.
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transplant recipients and making recommendations for change,
it is necessary to define the term "compliance," to understand
why compliance is so important for organ recipients, and to
identify some factors that may affect patient compliance. For
the purposes of this Note, compliance is defined as the willing-
ness or ability to adhere to a prescribed treatment regimen.'
Upon receiving a donor organ, a patient takes on a great
deal of responsibility to ensure the success of the transplant as
well as his or her own well-being. Because the donor organ, no
matter how close the match, is foreign to the recipient's body,
the patient must take medications to suppress the body's im-
mune system and prevent it from rejecting the organ. This drug
therapy continues for the duration of the patient's life.' Al-
though this may sound relatively simple, there are several
drawbacks to the use of these medications that may affect a
patient's compliance in taking them. First, many of these drugs
produce undesirable side effects that vary in severity and oc-
currence from patient to patient.7 For example, with kidney
transplant patients, a typical regimen may include prednisone,
cyclosporine, and azathioprine.8 Side effects caused by the use
of prednisone, for example, may include such changes in the
patient's physical appearance as "round cheeks, fat deposits on
the abdomen and upper back, increased growth of facial and
body hair, and acne."9 More seriously, these drugs produce a
generalized immunosuppression in the patient's body rendering
him or her susceptible to infection."0 This requires that the pa-
tient take special care to avoid infection and necessitates corn-
5. This definition is purposely broad to address as many of the arguments both for and
against such a recommendation.
6. Deborah Mathieu, Organ Substitution Technology: Identifying and Framing the Key
Issues, in ORGAN SUBSTITUTION TECHNOLoGY: ETHIcAL, LEGAL, AND PUBLIC PoLIcY IssuEs 3,5
(Deborah Mathieu ed., 1988) (discussing the costs and benefits of organ transplantation).
7. See id. (listing such serious side effects as "tremors, seizures, kidney and/or liver
failure, hypertension, lymphomas, diabetes, vision disorders, and anemia").
8. UNIVERsrrY HosprrALs OF CLEVELAND, KIDNEY TRANSPLANT RECiPIENr
INFORMATION 3-5 (n.d.) [hereinafter RECIPIENT INFORMATION] (on file with author) (discussing
post-transplant treatment with prednisone, azathioprine, and cyclosporine and the possible side ef-
fects to be expected from these medications); See also Nancy L. Ascher, The Pros and Cons of
Cyclosporine, in ORGAN SUBsTrrTunON TECHNOLOGY, supra note 6, app. B at 306-07 (presenting
empirical evidence of the pros and cons of using cyclosporine as medicine therapy for organ
recipients).
9. RECIPIENT INFORMATION, supra note 8, at 4.
10. Ascher, supra note 8, at 306.
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munication with the physician concerning even the slightest
infection, both to cover treatment and to rule out possible early
rejection." These medications also have been shown to in-
crease the patient's susceptibility to cancers of the lymph sys-
tem and to have toxic effects on the kidney. 2 The unpleasant-
ness of some of these side effects, particularly those affecting
physical appearance, are cited by some patients as reasons for
their noncompliance. 3
Secondly, these drugs are very expensive. The total cost
for a medical regimen including the three medications dis-
cussed above was estimated at over $10,000 per year in
1993."4 For transplant recipients, this financial obligation
alone produces real concerns because Medicare coverage of
these medications is currently limited to a maximum of the
first three years post-transplant. 5 In fact, in a study of trans-
plant patient compliance, the cost of medications was cited by
a few patients as the reason for their noncompliance. 6
Finally, careful monitoring of patients post-transplant is
also essential, particularly in the months immediately after sur-
gery. This requires frequent visits to the transplant center for
follow-up examinations and blood tests, sometimes as often as
twice a week for the first three months after transplant. 7 This
follow-up is both to identify possible signs of rejection (which,
if it occurs, is most likely to happen within the first year) and
11. See REClPIENT INFORMATION, supra note 8, at 3 (discussing the increased susceptibility
to infection caused by prednisone and azathioprine and the importance of quickly diagnosing a
rejection).
12. Ascher, supra note 8, at 306-07.
13. See A.E. Bittar et al., Patient Noncompliance as a Cause of Late Kidney Graft Failure,
24 TRANSPLANTATION PROC. 2720, 2721 (1992) (discussing findings of a clinical study of the
influence of noncompliance on late kidney graft failure); Robert T. Schweizer et al.,
Noncompliance in Organ Transplant Recipients, 49 TRANSPLATATION 374, 376 (1990)
(describing the incidence and reasons for medication noncompliance by transplant recipients).
14. Interview with Marilyn Bartucci, Head Nurse Manager, Transplant Center, University
Hospitals of Cleveland, in Cleveland, Ohio (Aug. 27, 1993).
15. 60 Fed. Reg. 8951 (1995). This is a recent change in the Medicare Program, which
previously covered immunosuppressant medications for only one year post-transplant.
16. Schweizer etal., supra note 13, at 376.
17. RECIPINT INFORMATION, supra note 8, at 5. This is an example of the protocol of one
transplant center, whose routine may vary from that of other centers. In general, however, the
patient's attendance at outpatient office and laboratory appointments is one way of measuring
patient compliance. See Mary Rovelli et al., Noncompliance in Organ Transplant Recipients, 21
TRANSPLANTATION PROC. 833, 833 (1989) (discussing empirical study to examine patient
noncompliance in organ recipients).
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to monitor the patient's response to drug therapy and adjust
dosages if necessary. 8
Most, if not all, commentators agree that the importance of
patient compliance with the post-transplant treatment regimen
cannot be overemphasized. [T]he medical reality [is] that suc-
cessful transplantation depends on patient compliance and
painstaking follow-up .... [M]any good and scarce organs
have been lost in patients who failed or forgot to take their
immunosuppressive medications, who failed to come to follow-
up visits, or who abused drugs or alcohol, with mortal sequel-
ae.
19
Identifying patients at risk for noncompliance with treat-
ment post-transplant is not an easy task. Whereas compliance
can be fairly accurately assessed for re-transplant patients, most
patients are first-time organ recipients whose predicted compli-
ance is much more difficult to assess.
In a study of noncompliance in organ transplant recipients,
the researchers examined two types of noncompliance - the
"failure to comply with the follow-up regimen... [and the]
failure to take medications as directed."2 The researchers
found that noncompliance with the follow-up regimen, such as
the failure to attend outpatient office visits or laboratory ap-
pointments, was easy to determine; however, medication non-
compliance was found to be more difficult to confirm.2' The
researchers were able to ascertain several instances of med-
ication noncompliance from patients who readily admitted their
noncompliance, relatives providing confirmation of noncomp-
liance, and unexplained decreases or increases in levels of the
drug cyclosporine. 2  Such unexplained decreases in
cyclosporine can signal the possibility that the patient may be
failing to take the medication, whereas unexplained increases
18. See RECiPmNT INFORMATION, supra note 8, at 3-5 (explaining post-transplant treat-
ment).
19. W.C. Waltzer et al., Equity in Organ Distribution: A Plea for a Return to Reality, 21
TRANSPLANTATION PROC. 3388, 3389 (1989). See also Developments in the Law: Medical
Technology and the Law, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1519, 1633 n.128 (1990) (stating that patients'
failure to comply with post-operative treatment results in unsuccessful transplantations (quoting
NEW YORK STATE TASK FORCE ON LIFE AND THE LAW, TRANSPLANTATION IN NEW YORK
STATE: THE PROCUREMENT AND DISmmuTION OF ORGANS AND TISSUES 110-11 (1988)).
20. Rovelli et al., supra note 17, at 833.
21. Id.
22. Id.
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might demonstrate that the patient may be trying to hide non-
compliance by taking high doses immediately prior to clinic
visits.' For some patients, noncompliance could only be
strongly suspected, but not confirmed, because of frequent
rejection episodes easily controlled with the administration of
immunosuppressants.24
Assessment of the risk of noncompliance with a primary
(first-time) recipient is more difficult. This requires both an
examination of pre-transplant behaviors and predictions about
whether the patient will continue to exhibit those behaviors
after the transplant. There is a broad range of patients whose
post-transplant compliance may be questionable. Such patients
include, but are not limited to, the following: those whose
financial circumstances impact their ability to comply with
treatment, those whose intellectual capacity affects their ability
to understand the transplant process and the importance of
post-operative treatment, those who engage in behaviors that
may affect their judgment or willingness to comply with treat-
ment, and those who merely lack an understanding of their
illness and the ramifications of noncompliance.
III. THE CURRENT PROCESS FOR SELECTING
ORGAN TRANSPLANT RECIPIENTS
The process for selecting potential organ recipients has
undergone a number of changes in the last fifteen years. In the
mid 1980s, a great deal of public concern and outrage about
the inequitable distribution of organs led Congress to take ac-
tion.' The public was reacting specifically to the apparent
preferential treatment by transplant centers that was being
given to the wealthy, including several foreign nationals, when
selecting organ transplant recipients.2 In response, Congress
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Kathleen W. Possai,A StructuralAnalysis ofthe Market for Human Organs 43-44 (Jan.
1992) (unpublished Ph.D dissertation, Temple University) (describing the history of
transplantation regulation).
26. Id. See also Esther L. Benenson, UNOS: Evolution of the Organ Procurement and
Transplantation Network, 20 DIALYSIS AND TRANSPLANTATION 495, 495 (1991) (discussing the
organ shortage problem and the subsequent development of the Organ Procurement and
Transplantation Network).
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enacted the National Organ Transplant Act in 1984 which,
among other things, called for the establishment of a task force
on organ transplantation by the Secretary of Health and Human
Services.' The Task Force's primary purpose "was to conduct
comprehensive examinations of the medical, legal, ethical,
economic, and social issues presented by human organ pro-
curement and transplantation ... .,,2 Pursuant to the National
Organ Transplant Act, the Task Force investigated and ulti-
mately recommended the creation of a National Organ Procure-
ment and Transplantation Network (OPTN).29 In 1986, the
federal government awarded the contract to administer the
OPTN to the United Network for Organ Sharing (UNOS), a
private, non-profit organization.30
The primary responsibilities of UNOS include overseeing
all aspects of "organ procurement and transplantation through-
out the United States while administering a national organ
allocation system based on scientific and medical factors and
practices."31 In conjunction with this role, UNOS has devel-
oped policies designed to ensure equitable organ allocation to
those registered on the national patient waiting list.32 To en-
sure compliance with UNOS policies, Congress made Medicare
and Medicaid reimbursement to transplant centers contingent
upon OPTN membership and adherence to the rules set forth
by UNOS."
27. National Organ Transplant Act, Pub. L. No. 98-507, § 101(a) (1984), reprinted in
ORGAN SUBSTrrTIoN TECHNOLOGY, supra note 6, app. D at 309.
28. Task Force on Organ Transplantation, Organ Transplantation - Issues and
Recommendations (1986), reprinted in ORGAN SUBSTITTON TECHNOLOGY, supra note 6, app. A
at 297 [hereinafter Task Force].
29. Id.at30l.
30. Developments in the Law, supra note 19, at 1630 n.109. These contracts were renewed
for consecutive three-year periods in October, 1990 and 1993. United Network for Organ Sharing
(UNOS), General Information on the United Network for Organ Sharing and Its Policies and
Programs, United Network for Organ Sharing Fact Sheet (Jan. 1994) (on file with author)
[hereinafter UNOS General Information].
31. UNOS General Information, supra note 30.
32. Id.
33. Several questions have been raised about Congress' ability to delegate power to a
private firm and the subsequent authority of UNOS. This topic, however, is not within the scope
of this Note. For a discussion of these issues, see Articles of Incorporation of the United Network
for Organ Sharing (Nov. 3, 1994) (on file with author and available from UNOS upon request)
and James F. Blumstein, Government's Role in Organ Transplantation Policy, in ORGAN
TRANSPLANTATION POLICY: ISSUES AND PROSPECrS 5 (James F. Blumstein et al. eds., 1989)
(discussing the federal government's involvement in organ transplantation policy and the
510 [Vol. 6:503
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The actual criteria for selecting organ recipients set forth
by UNOS is, however, the last part of a three-stage process for
selecting potential organ recipients." The first stage involves
the referral of a patient with end-stage organ failure to a trans-
plant center. Specifically, it focuses on the question of whether
or not a referral actually takes place. Arthur L. Caplan, a
prominent figure in the field of biomedical ethics and author of
several books and articles on organ procurement and trans-
plantation, emphasizes this stage of the process. Caplan feels
that patient referral to a transplant center is not necessarily
determined by whether a patient is in need of an organ trans-
plant. 6 Instead, he maintains that referrals occur as a result of
multiple factors including "public opinion, the availability of
doctors capable of diagnosing end-stage organ failure, political
considerations, individual self-perceptions of health, and gener-
al beliefs within the medical community about the utility of
various kinds of transplants."'37
Caplan focuses in particular on the private physician's
referral of his or her patient to a transplant center. First, Caplan
points out that because few patients go directly to a transplant
center on their own, a number of patients are unlikely to be
referred simply because they have no insurance and, therefore,
no private physician to make that referral. Second, Caplan
discusses that even those patients with private physicians may
not be referred. 9 He attributes this to the following reasons:
1) physicians with no direct connection to, or expertise in
transplantation may not be up to date on the latest break-
relationship between the federal government and UNOS).
34. This process has been described by different commentators as having either two or four
stages. See Dan W. Brock, Ethical Issues in Recipient Selection for Organ Transplantation, in
ORGAN SUBMST1rrON TECHNOLOGY, supra note 6, at 87 (describing a two-stage process that
includes formation of a waiting list and recipient selection from that list when an organ becomes
available); ARTHuR L. CAPLAN, IF I WERE A RICH MAN, COULD I BUY A PANCREAS? 164-70
(1992) (describing a four-stage process for the selection of organ recipients: eligibility,
admissibility, distribution, and selection). The author of this Note has adopted three stages to aid
in focusing on specific issues within the process as well as on the concerns expressed by these
other commentators.
35. CAPLAN, supra note 34, at 164-67.
36. Id. at 164.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 166-67.
39. Id. at 167.
19961
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throughs in the field; 2) physicians may be allowing their own
views about the uncertainty of a patient's quality of life post-
transplant to interfere with the making of referrals; 3) physi-
cians who have a financial interest in one form of therapy,
such as dialysis, may not have as great an interest in suggest-
ing alternatives; 4) physicians who are aware of the financial
difficulties of their patients may not even raise transplantation
as an option because of the expense of the procedure and need
for lifelong immunosuppressant therapy; and 5) patients' per-
sonality characteristics, such as shyness, fearfulness, noncom-
pliance, or abusiveness, may result in less than enthusiastic
referrals, or no referral at all.'
Caplan is not alone is his views about this problem. Bar-
bara Levine, a social worker at a local transplant center, re-
vealed her concerns about private physicians acting as gate-
keepers for transplant programs.41 Ms. Levine instead believes
that all patients with end-stage organ disease should be referred
to a transplant center where experts in the field can evaluate
the patients' suitability for a transplant and properly educate
them about all of their options.42 Although it is likely that
patient compliance is a factor at this point, it is extremely
difficult to identify definitively the role patient compliance
actually plays at this initial stage because of: the number and
variety of physicians involved in this stage of the process, the
fact that many of these patients are never referred for a trans-
plant, and even if the possibility of transplantation is discussed,
the reasons why the physician did not make the referral are not
disclosed to the patient.
The second stage in the process of selecting potential
organ recipients involves what happens after referral to a trans-
plant center.4' Before beginning this discussion, it should be
40. Id.
41. Interview with Barbara Levine, Social Worker, Transplant Service, University Hos-
pitals of Cleveland, in Cleveland, Ohio (Feb. 13, 1995) [hereinafter Levine Interview].
42. Id. Cf Martin Benjamin et a]., What Transplantation Can Teach Us About Health Care
Reform, 330 NEw ENG. J. MED. 858, 860 (1994) (stating that the role of gatekeeper is difficult but
not intolerable as loyalty to the patient can be balanced with responsible allocation of organs).
43. This stage corresponds to the first stage described by Brock, supra note 34, at 87-97
(describing criteria to be used in evaluating and selecting organ recipients), and the second stage
described by Caplan, in CAPLAN, supra note 34, at 168 (labeling the second stage as admissibility
and describing the factors which may influence it).
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pointed out that "[e]ach local transplant team formulates and
applies its own criteria for waiting-list placement and patient
selection."'  For this reason, the criteria used generally "vary
from center to center, and a candidate rejected at one center
may be accepted at another."'4
Kidney transplantation candidates "undergo an evaluation
process in order to identify medical, social, and psychological
factors that may affect successful outcome."'  A survey of all
U.S. transplant centers performing kidney transplants falling
under UNOS supervision in 1991 was conducted by the Patient
Care and Education Committee of the American Society of
Transplant Physicians (ASTP).47 The authors concluded that:
1) there are many situations in which clinical practices differ;
and 2) it is likely that each center's selection criteria evolves
from that center's prior experience.' For example, such dif-
ferences in clinical practices include the make-up of the evalu-
ation committees,49 the diagnostic testing performed on pa-
tients to determine suitability,' patient age limits,"1 and the
medical contraindications to transplantation.52
These centers were also questioned about some of the
factors considered in assessing patient compliance. The results
again showed a difference among those responding. For exam-
ple, eighty-three percent of the centers responding consider the
patient's attendance at dialysis in this assessment, but other
44. Developments in the Law, supra note 19, at 1630-31.
45. Id. at 1631, n.110.
46. Eleanor L. Ramos et al., The Evaluation of Candidates for Renal Transplantation: The
Current Practice of U.S. Transplant Centers, 57 TRANSPLANTATION 490, 490 (1994).
47. Id.
48. Id. at 493.
49. Id. at 491. The list of health care professionals reported by respondent transplant
centers as being members of their evaluation committees includes: transplant coordinators,
nephrologists, social workers, transplant surgeons, nurses, tissue-typing personnel, urologists,
nutritionists, immunologists, psychologists, psychiatrists, and dentists. Id.
50. Id. at 491-92. For example, cardiac and gastrointestinal testing of patients varies from
aggressive testing of all patients, to testing of patients over a certain age, to those patients with
significant histories, to symptomatic patients, to no specific policies for testing at all. Id.
51. Id. at 491. Sixty-six percent of respondent centers report no specific age limits for renal
recipients while the remaining 34% have age limits ranging from 48-80 years. Id.
52. Id. at 495 (discussing several contraindicators). For example, over 90% of respondent
centers exclude HIV-positive patients because of the fear "that increased immunosuppression may
accelerate the conversion to AIDS." Id. However, significant differences between centers exist in
the exclusion of patients on the basis of underlying cardiac disease and various types of hepatitis.
Id.
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factors that may help to determine patient compliance are in-
consistently assessed. 3 The study revealed that centers also
vary in their treatment of patients with a history of drug abuser
with some centers requiring a specific period of abstinence
prior to transplantation, some requiring both abstinence and a
negative drug screen, some excluding patients with a drug
history altogether, and some centers having no specific policy
at all.54 Perhaps the most uniform management of patients
involves those with a history of psychosis. According to the
survey, eighty percent of the responding centers require a psy-
chiatric evaluation in patients with a history a psychosis,
whereas only six percent reported no specific policy for this
factor.5 Unfortunately, the survey did not address the weight
which centers give to noncompliant behavior (or factors af-
fecting a patient's ability to comply) when assessing a patient's
suitability for a transplant.
The lack of uniformity between all transplant centers
pointed out by this study is, however, consistent with the
findings of other commentators. Another survey examining the
psychosocial evaluation of organ transplant recipients was
conducted by members of the Medical College of Virginia.56
In contrast to the ASTP Study discussed above, respondents in
this survey identified the weight given to each factor by stating
whether the factor would be: 1) an absolute contraindication to
transplant; 2) a relative contraindication to transplant; or 3)
irrelevant in the consideration of a patient for transplant. 7
53. Id. at 493. For example, a substantially lower number of centers considered patients
signing off dialysis prior to completing the treatment (48%), blood chemistry and cyclosporine
levels possibly indicating dietary or medication noncompliance (41% and 50% respectively), and
the patient's blood pressure control which also may indicate dietary or medication noncompliance
(40%). Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. James L. Levenson & Mary E. Olbrisch, Psychosocial Evaluation of Organ Transplant
Candidates: A Comparative Study of Process, Criteria, and Outcomes in Heart, Liver, and Kidney
Transplantation, 34 PsYcHosoMATics 314,314 (1993). In contrast to the ASTP Study which only
examined criteria for renal transplants, the Virginia Study includes data about heart, liver, and
kidney transplant programs. Id. The heart transplant programs surveyed were all U.S. members of
the International Society for Heart Transplantation, while the liver and kidney programs were
under the supervision of UNOS. Id. at 315.
57. Levenson & Olbrisch, supra note 56, at 315. Those items which were left blank also
were counted in the irrelevant category. Id. Contraindication is defined as "a condition or
circumstance that indicates a form of treatment.., is inappropriate in a specific case." THE NEW
[Vol. 6:503
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Although ideally the amount of weight given to each factor
would be more clearly defined, the terms absolute, relative, and
irrelevant at least provide some insight into the degree of im-
portance which the transplant centers assign to these factors.
Table 3 below summarizes many of the results of the Virginia
Study.5 8
WEBSTER'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 48 (Donald 0. Bolander ed., 1992).
58. Levinson & Olbrisch, supra note 56, at 317-19. The results presented in this table can
be found within Tables 3-5 of the Levinson & Olbrisch article. Id. This single table has been
created using those results in an effort to focus on the areas consistent with the purposes and scope
of this Note. The values in this table represent percentages of responding centers only. See id. at
315. In other words, the values for renal transplant programs in this table represent a percentage
of only the 71% of renal transplant programs responding to the survey. ld. Likewise, as both the
cardiac and liver transplant programs had 64% response rates, the cardiac and liver values in this
table represent a percentage of only those responding programs. Id.
5151996]
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Table 3 -- Psychosocial Contraindications to Transplant
[Vol. 6:503
Cardiac Liver Renal Cardiac Liver Renal
No support person Excesslv caffeine ue
Absoute 9.0 6.5 2.6 Absolute 0.0 0.0 0.0
Relative 66.7 67.4 33.5 Relative 29.5 21.7 9.1
Irrelevant 24.4 26.1 63.9 Irrelevant 70.5 78.3 90.9
Current felony prisoner Current clg. smoking
Absolute 46.2 39.1 20.6 Absolute 43.6 2.2 1.3
Relative 29.5 30.4 37.4 Relative 47.4 34.8 21.4
Irrelevant 24.4 30.4 41.9 Irrelevant 9.0 63.0 77.3
Hx 4,. criminal behavior CIg. smoking in 6 months
Absolute 29.5 17.4 5.2 Absolute 2.6 0.0 0.0
Relative 47.4 45.7 52.9 Relative 48.7 28.3 14.9
Irrelevant 23.1 37.0 41.9 Irrelevant 48.7 713 85.1
Mental retardation IQ<70 Current heavy alcohol we
Absolute 25.6 10.9 2.6 Absolute 80.8 80.4 41.6
Relative 59.0 69.6 51.3 Relative 17.9 13.0 42.9
Irrelevant 15.4 19.6 46.1 Irrelevant 1.3 6.5 15.6
Severe retardation IQ<50 Aleohol abe in 6 months
Absolute 74.4 45.7 24.0 Absolute 21.8 23.9 14.9
Relative 19.2 41.3 51.9 Relative 69.2 58.7 47.4
Irrelevant 6.4 13.0 24.0 Irrelevant 9.0 17.4 37.7
Significant obesity Cmrent addictive drug ue
Absolute 25.6 2.2 13.0 Absolute 92-3 84.8 69.5
Relative 59.0 60.9 56.5 Relative 7.7 8.7 24.0
Irrelevant 15.4 37.0 30.5 Irrelevant 0.0 6.5 6.5
Dietary noncompliance Addictive drug use In 6
Absolute I 1.5 8.7 5.2 mouths
Relative 71.8 56.5 53.2 Absolute 35.9 32.6 17.5
Irlevant 16.7 34.8 41.6 Relative 56.4 54.3 60.4
Irrelevant 7.7 13.0 22.1
Medication noncompliance Denial of illness severity
Absolute 51.3 32.6 35.7 Absolute 34.6 34.8 18.8
Relative 47.4 60.9 51.9 Relative 55.1 47.8 53.9
Irrelevant 1.3 6.5 12.3 Irrelevant 10.3 17.4 273
AMA hosp. discharge Ha. Trasplant not understood
Absolute 26.9 8.7 5.8 Absolute 21.8 15.2 16.9
Relative 61.5 73.9 58.4 Relative 60-3 71.7 48.7
Itlevant 11.5 17.4 35.7 Irrelevant 17.9 130 34.4
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Although these results are significant for a number of
reasons, at least three observations immediately stand out: 1)
there is an incredible lack of uniformity in the evaluation and
weight given to psychosocial criteria; 2) there are organ-spe-
cific differences in the evaluation process, with that for cardiac
transplants being the strictest and that for kidney transplants
being the most lenient; and 3) the evaluation of patient compli-
ance, particularly with medications, is an important consider-
ation in determining a patient's suitability for receiving a trans-
plant. 9
The authors of the Virginia Study do not attempt to ex-
plain these differences, nor do they call for absolute uniformity
in the selection process. They do, however, advocate a national
or international consensus conference to prioritize the consider-
ation of criteria and to help establish guidelines for transplant
centers in the recipient selection process." These authors also
attempt to explain the differences observed based upon which
organ is transplanted:
It has been noted that criteria within individual transplant pro-
grams tend to become more lenient over time. Since kidney
transplant programs have existed much longer, this may, in part,
explain their greater leniency. Clinicians may also feel less
pressured to make an optimal choice of transplant recipient
because it does not seem that "squandering" a kidney results in
another patient's death.6'
While this may explain the leniency of kidney transplant
programs, it does not explain the differences between liver and
heart programs, with heart transplant programs being stricter
than liver programs. Since liver transplantation was developed
after heart transplantation,62 the leniency-over-time theory
'does not apply. Instead, Levenson and Olbrisch suggest that,
because a large percentage of the liver patients evaluated have
alcohol or substance abuse problems, more leniency is required
because of the nature of the population of potential liver trans-
59. Id. at 320.
60. Id. at 322.
61. Id. at 320. Patients suffering from end-stage renal disease have the alternative of
dialysis while patients with end-stage heart or liver disease have no alternative. See Developments
in the Law, supra note 19, at 1632.
62. Levenson & Olbrisch, supra note 56, at 320.
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plant recipients.' In fact, patients with alcohol-related end-
stage liver disease represent over fifty percent of the patients
with end-stage liver disease.'
These studies also demonstrate that patient compliance
clearly has a role at this stage of the selection of organ trans-
plant recipients, but because it is not considered equally by all
transplant centers (if considered at all), it is, once again, dif-
ficult precisely to define the role of patient compliance in this
stage of the process. As Table 3 above demonstrates, patient
noncompliance, particularly with medications, does weigh very
heavily in determining a candidate's suitability for an organ
transplant.6' The most obvious point these studies make, how-
ever, is that, like the first stage of selecting potential organ
recipients, the second stage lacks uniformity and arguably may
be viewed as unfair.
The third and final stage of the overall selection process
involves the selection of patients from the waiting list when the
organ becomes available.' Although, theoretically, this stage
of the process is governed by UNOS and its criteria for the
distribution of organs, some commentators, notably Arthur L.
Caplan, believe that this is not the case.67
The selection of organ recipients generally is determined
by a point system developed by UNOS which considers both
medical and non-medical criteria. Because of the perishable
nature of some organs, distance plays a role in the distribution
of hearts, livers, pancreas, lungs, and organ combinations.'
63. Id.
64. Alvin H. Moss & Mark Siegler, Should Alcoholics Compete Equally for Liver Trans-
plantation?, 265 JAMA 1295, 1295 (1991).
65. See supra Table 3. Dietary non-compliance was considered an absolute
contraindication to transplantation by 11.5% of cardiac transplant programs, 8.7% of liver trans-
plant programs, and 5.2% of renal transplant programs. Id. It was considered a relative
contraindication by 71.8% of cardiac programs, 56.5% of liver programs, and 53.2% of renal
programs. Id. Medication non-compliance was weighed even more heavily by the responding
centers, with 51.3% of cardiac programs, 32.6% of liver programs, and 35.7% of renal programs
reporting it an absolute contraindication. Medication non-compliance was considered a relative
contraindication by 47.4% of cardiac programs, 60.9% of liver programs, and 51.9% of renal
programs. Id.
66. This corresponds to Caplan's fourth stage, labeled as selection, in CAPLAN, supra note
34, at 170, and to the second stage described by Brock, supra note 34, at 87.
67. CAPLAN, supra note 34, at 169 (stating that "[i]ndividual transplant centers, despite the
existence of UNOS, frequently claim rights over organs they procure").
68. See Possai, supra note 25, at 57-58 (describing the organ allocation point system used
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For these organs a specific number of points generally are al-
lowed for blood-type matching, length of time on the waiting
list, degree of medical urgency, and patient proximity to the
69transplant center.
For kidney transplants, the process is somewhat different.
Because kidneys can last for approximately forty-eight to sev-
enty-two hours after harvest,70 and kidney recipients are usual-
ly not in a life-threatening situation, extra time is available for
more extensive testing of the donor kidney to find the best
match possible." The distribution of cadaveric kidneys weighs
very heavily on antigen matching. Antigens are specific pro-
teins that "are present on every cell of the [h]uman body, and
help the body determine what is ... 'foreign."' 72 If the body
recognizes something as foreign, an immune response is trig-
gered and antibodies are released to attack the foreign mat-
ter. 3 The UNOS system for distribution of cadaveric kidneys
gives priority to zero antigen mismatches,74 which are, theo-
retically, the least likely to result in rejection. If there is a
patient with a zero antigen mismatch and comparable blood
type, he or she will be offered the kidney regardless of other
factors such as length of time on the waiting list and geograph-
ic allocation.75 If no zero antigen mismatch exists, the quality
of antigen matches, length of time on the waiting list, and geo-
graphic allocation are awarded points as defined by UNOS
and/or the individual transplant center.76 The patient with the
by UNOS). See also UNITED NETWORK FOR ORGAN SHARING, FACrs EVERYONE SHOULD KNOW
ABour ORGAN DONATION AND TRANSPLANTATION (n.d.) [hereinafter UNOS FACTS] (stating the
preservation times as follows: four to six hours for hearts, lungs, and heart-lung; 12-24 hours for
livers; and 48-72 hours for kidneys).
69. Possai, supra note 25, at 57-58; United Network for Organ Sharing, Policies §§ 3.6-3.8
(Nov. 3, 1994) (on file with author and available from UNOS upon request). There are additional
factors which may be considered depending upon the organ being transplanted. See generally id.
§§ 3.5-3.9. For example, the comparison of donor and recipient size is an important consideration
in liver distribution. Id. § 3.6.1.
70. UNOS FACTS, supra note 68.
71. Ian Ayres et a]., Unequal Access to Kidney Transplantation, 46 VAND. L. REV. 805,
815 (1993) (stating that "[c]urrent UNOS policies explicitly mandate allocation of cadaveric
kidneys to potential recipients with antigens similar to those of the donor").
72. Possa, supra note 25, at 55.
73. Id.
74. United Network for Organ Sharing, Policies, § 3.5.2 (Nov. 3, 1993).
75. Id. § 3.5.2.3. See also Ayres et al., supra note 71, at 818-19 (describing that, within the
UNOS point system for selecting kidney transplant recipients, the greatest weight is placed on the
number of antigens matched).
76. United Network for Organ Sharing, Policies, §§ 3.5.3-3.5.6 (Nov. 3, 1993). Patients
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highest numerical score is offered the kidney.' Although
these criteria for organ distribution were initially well-received,
advances in the area of immunosuppressant drugs and the
inequitable results of this method have resulted in an increasing
amount of criticism about them. 78
Discussion of the current system of recipient selection
raises questions about how these scarce organs are distributed
and how to improve this process. Ideally, the solution is to
increase the supply of organs to avoid making difficult alloca-
tion decisions; however, recent efforts geared toward increasing
the supply have been unsuccessful and a number of other pro-
posals thus far have been rejected.79 The failure of these ef-
may be listed on the local lists of multiple transplant centers and on the UNOS waiting lists
multiple times. Id. § 3.2.2. In general, kidneys are allocated first locally, then regionally, then na-
tionally. Id. § 3.5.3.
77. Id. § 3.5.6. For pediatric patients, extra points for kidney allocation based upon the
child's age are awarded at the time the patient is initially listed. Id. at § 3.5.6.5. These points are
retained until the patient turns 18 years of age. Id.
78. This criticism generally is related to the racial inequality that results from the current
system of organ distribution. For more information on this topic, see Ayres et al., supra note 71
(exploring the disparate racial impact of mandated antigen matching and whether this effect is
justified given recent technological advances); James F. Childress, Artificial and Transplanted
Organs, in BIoLAW: A LEGAL AND ETHICAL REPORTER ON MEDICINE, HEALTH CARE, AND
BIOENGINEERING § 13-6 (James F. Childress et al. eds., 1986) (discussing generally various
proposed criteria for the selection of recipients of organ transplants).
79. For further information about organ procurement and the current efforts and proposals
geared toward increasing the supply of donor organs, the following references are recommended:
United Network for Organ Sharing, Policies, § 2.0 (Nov. 3, 1993) (describing the minimum
procurement standards for an organ procurement organization); Linda C. Fentiman, Organ
Donations: The Failure of Altruism, IsSUES SCI. & TECH., Fall 1994, at 43 (urging an organ
donation system based on presumed consent, compensated donation, and community preference);
Benjamin et al., supra note 42, at 858-59; A.H. Barnett & David L. Kaserman, The Shortage of
Organs for Transplantation: Exploring the Alternatives, 9 IssUES L. & MED. 117 (1993)
(evaluating six currently proposed alternative organ procurement systems); James F. Blumstein,
The Use of Financial Incentives in Medical Care: The Case of Commerce in Transplantable
Organs, 3 HEALTH MATRIX 1 (1993) (discussing the advantages of using forward contracts for
transplantable cadaveric organs); CAPLAN, supra note 34, at 145-70 (discussing the ethics of
organ procurement); Teri Randall, Too Few Human Organs for Transplantation, Too Many in
Need... and the Gap Widens, 265 JAMA 1223 (1991) (discussing the shrinking supply and
increasing demand for organs); Teri Randall & Charles Marwick, Physicians' Attitudes and
Approaches Are Pivotal in Procuring Organs for Transplantation, 265 JAMA 1227 (1991)
(discussing ways to increase organ donation); Developments in the Law, supra note 19, at 1617-30
(discussing attempts to obtain an adequate supply of donor organs); Chad D. Naylor, Note, The
Role of the Family in Cadaveric Organ Procurement, 65 IND. LJ. 167 (1989) (evaluating the role
of the family in cadaveric organ procurement and whether this role should be eliminated or
recognized in an effort to obtain more organs); Arthur L. Caplan, Beg, Borrow, or Steal: The
Ethics of Solid Organ Procurement, in ORGAN SUBSTrTUION TECHNOLOGY, supra note 6, at 59
(discussing the ethical and policy issues facing procurement of scarce organs). See also Thomas
D. Overcast, Legal Aspects of Death and Informed Consent in Organ Transplantation, in HuMAN
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forts necessitates dealing with the reality: there are too few
organs and too many patients in need. Although dealing with
this reality requires making difficult decisions, these decisions
often cannot be avoided.80
IV. A PROPOSAL FOR CHANGING THE CURRENT
SYSTEM OF SELECTING ORGAN TRANSPLANT
RECIPIENTS
A. Defining the Proposal
Before proposing a change in the current system of dis-
tributing these scarce organs, one first must look at the goals to
be achieved by transplantation. Generally, the ability of a pa-
tient to benefit from a transplant and the likelihood of a suc-
cessful outcome are the goals of transplantation."' With these
goals in mind, it is recommended that transplant centers uni-
formly consider a patient's willingness or ability to comply
with treatment post-transplant in the selection of organ recip-
ients. This change would be in addition to, and not in lieu of,
the medical criteria currently employed in selecting organ re-
cipients. 2 Because of the difficulties in assessing patient com-
pliance discussed above, it is recommended that all patients be
assessed for their ability to comply with the treatment, but that
ORGAN TRANSPLANTATION: SOCIETAL, MEDICAL-LEGAL, REGULATORY, AND REIMBURSEMENT
ISSUES 55 (Dale H. Cowan et al. eds., 1987) (discussing various legal issues involved in the
retrieval and transplantation of hearts).
80. The author does not recommend forgoing efforts to increase the supply of organs but
instead advocates continuing efforts geared toward organ procurement while addressing the
immediate problem of scarcity.
81. See J.A. Robertson, Patient Selection for Organ Transplantation: Age, Incarceration,
Family Support, and Other Social Factors, 21 TRANsPLANTATION PROc. 3397, 3398 (1989)
(discussing a wide consensus that medical utility in use of the organ by individual patients
represents a minimum threshold); Task Force, supra note 28, at 303 (discussing the Task Force's
recommendations on what goals must be emphasized when proposing a change in the current sys-
tem of organ recipient selection).
82. The author acknowledges the controversy surrounding the current medical criteria used
for the selection of organ recipients, and the lack of uniformity in their use. See generally Ayres et
al., supra note 71 (discussing the disparate racial impact of mandated antigen matching and
whether this effect is justified given recent technological advances); Ramos et al., supra note 46
(presenting the criteria used by various transplant centers to evaluate candidates for renal
transplantation). However, it is impossible to address all of these issues in this Note. For the
purposes of this Note, therefore, the current medical criteria are accepted as a given, and the as-
sumption is made that these criteria are uniformly applied even though, in reality, this is not the
case.
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potential exclusion of a patient based on this factor be limited
to re-transplant patients and potential kidney recipients only.83
Under this proposal, the assessment of re-transplant pa-
tients would be carried out in the same manner as noncomplia-
nce was assessed for transplant recipients in the Compliance
Study, discussed previously.84 Such an assessment involves an
examination of the patient's previous compliance with the fol-
low-up regimen for the prior transplants and a determination of
his or her compliance with medications.85 If the patient's or-
gan rejection, either solely or in part, is a result of noncomp-
liance, he or she would proceed to the second step, which will
be described later.
Assessment of the behaviors or circumstances of primary
kidney recipients that may affect their post-operative compli-
ance would involve a two-step process. The first step would be
to identify patients whose ability or willingness to comply with
post-operative treatment is questionable. This conclusion
should not be speculative. Rather, it should be based upon
evidence obtained during an evaluation process. This evaluation
would involve examining each patient's medical history for
evidence of recurrent noncompliance in the past.' Such evi-
dence could include attendance at dialysis, adherence to a drug
regimen, compliance with any dietary restrictions, attendance at
appointments, or a history of hospital discharges against medi-
cal advice. 7 This evaluation also should include an assess-
ment of the patient's support system, if any, and its role in the
83. As re-transplant patients have been through the process once, it is easier to determine
their potential for noncompliance by examining their behavior and medical records from the prior
transplant. However, medication noncompliance sometimes must be based on the weight of the
evidence as opposed to its actual confirmation. See Rovelli et al., supra note 17, at 833 (dis-
cussing the use of confirmation by family members and unexplained increases and decreases in
cyclosporine as factors in determining noncompliance). Kidney transplant patients also are good
candidates for such a proposal because they have the alternative of dialysis treatment available to
them. See Developments in the Law, supra note 19, at 1632.
84. Rovelli et aL, supra note 17, at 833.
85. Id.
86. Levine Interview, supra note 41. Ms. Levine emphasized that isolated instances of
noncompliance are not uncommon, particularly with chronically ill patients, and that
noncompliance is, to a certain degree, a part of human nature. Id. Therefore, for the purposes of
this proposal, only repeated instances or patterns of noncompliance should be considered.
87. See Rovelli et aL, supra note 17, at 833 (discussing the use of adherence to diet,
medication, and dialysis schedules and attendance at appointments in assessing and predicting
noncompliance-in-treatment patients).
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patient's post-transplant life.8 A support system may include
family, friends, agencies, or associations. An analysis of the
patient's financial status, including health insurance and its
coverage provisions,8 9 sources of income, job history and sta-
bility, is also recommended.' Evaluation of the patient's his-
tory further should include determining the existence of any
prior or current history of mental health disorders or dimin-
ished intellectual capacity, prior or current history of substance
abuse,9' and the ability of the patient, or responsible party, to
articulate a basic understanding of the illness and the treatment
involved.92 Because potential organ recipients are in some
88. Schweizer, supra note 13, at 376 (suggesting recommendations for facilitating
treatment adherence). An example of this process was discussed during a recent interview. A
mentally retarded patient was being evaluated for a possible kidney transplant. The patient was
married to a woman who was also mentally retarded. Neither of them was able fully to
comprehend the procedure or the post-operative care involved with the transplant. Because there
was no other family involved, the transplant center consulted with several agencies working with
the patient, none of which would accept responsibility for the patient's care post-operatively. As a
result, the patient was ultimately denied placement on the transplant waiting list. Levine
Interview, supra note 41.
89. A brief discussion of Medicare coverage for end-stage renal patients may be helpful in
understanding the financial considerations of potential transplant patients. Patients with a
diagnosis of permanent kidney failure or end-stage renal disease (ESRD) become eligible for
Medicare under the End-Stage Renal Disease Medicare program established by Congress in 1972.
Medicare Part A covers any medically necessary inpatient hospital care. HEALTH CARE FIN.
ADMN., U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., MEDICARE: COVERAGE OF KIDNEY
DIALYSIS AND KIDNEY TRANSPLANT SERVICES 1 (1992) [hereinafter MEDICARE COVERAGE]. For
patients with ESRD, however, most of the services and supplies are provided by the elective Part
B coverage, which covers outpatient maintenance dialysis. Id. at 2. For patients undergoing a
transplant, Part A covers the inpatient services related to the actual surgery as well as the hospital
services provided in preparation for the transplant, such as the Kidney Registry fee, laboratory
services, and other diagnostic testing. Id. at 6. Part B covers the surgeon's services for performing
the transplant and immunosuppressive medications for up to three years following discharge from
the hospital. Id. at 7; 60 Fed. Reg. 8951 (1995). For patients entitled to Medicare only because of
ESRD, Part A coverage ends 12 months after dialysis is no longer required or 36 months after a
kidney transplant. MEDICARE COVERAGE, supra, at 2. Part B coverage, which is elective and
requires the payment of a premium, may be discontinued by the patient at any time, but is discon-
tinued automatically when Part A coverage terminates under the conditions already discussed. Id.
Should the need for dialysis recur, as with the failure of the transplant, Medicare coverage is
immediately reinstated. Id.
90. See Schweizer, supra note 13, at 376 (discussing findings of noncompliance in patients
of lower socioeconomic status). This will help to identify patients whose financial circumstances
may affect their ability to comply with post-transplant treatment, such as those in a middle income
bracket who may lack insurance coverage for medications. Id. This information also may help to
identify potential conflicts patients may have that relate to the need for time off work. Id.
91. See Rovelli et al, supra note 17, at 833 (stating that the results of the Compliance
Study revealed that two definite reasons for noncompliance in organ transplant recipients were
mental disease and alcoholism).
92. Interview with Roberta A. Stokes, Clinical Nurse Specialist, Cleveland Clinic
Foundation, in Cleveland, Ohio (Feb. 15, 1995) [hereinafter Stokes Interview]. Throughout the
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stage of organ failure at the time they are being evaluated, it is
likely that most, if not all, of this information would be avail-
able to evaluators with the patient's consent.
After primary kidney recipients with potential compliance
problems have been identified, the second step would involve
discovering the reasons underlying the problems identified. For
example, a patient who repeatedly fails to take medication
because he or she cannot afford it would have different needs
than a patient who repeatedly forgets to take medication be-
cause he or she is under the influence of illegal drugs or alco-
hol. Although both of these hypothetical patients would be con-
sidered at risk for noncompliance, once these underlying rea-
sons have been ascertained, those conducting the evaluations
can better assess what the patient's specific needs are and how
to remedy any existing problems so that the risk is no longer
an issue.
B. Implementing the Proposal
The end result of implementing these changes would be
the same three-stage process discussed above, but with signifi-
cant modifications. Under this proposal, the first stage of the
process would continue to involve the patient's private physi-
cian. However, these physicians would be required to refer all
patients in need of an organ to a transplant center. The private
physicians would no longer be serving as gatekeepers, thereby
eliminating the danger of legitimate candidates being kept from
the resources and treatment they need. Instead, the private
physician would explain the reason for the referral and what
the referral entails. Documentation of the information given to
the patient should be fully detailed in the patient's medical
record. The physician also should document if the patient re-
fuses to consent to a referral or otherwise does not follow up
with it.
interview, Ms. Stokes emphasized that patient education is of primary importance for potential
organ recipients. Id. She recommended that such education be provided at a level which the
patient can understand and further be reinforced periodically throughout the pre-operative period.
Ms. Stokes pointed out that, because the waiting period for organs can he lengthy, patients often
forget what they were told during the initial evaluation, which is the time when most pre-operative
education takes place.
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These changes would necessitate educating private physi-
cians caring for these patients about the need to refer all pa-
tients in end-stage organ failure to a transplant center at the
appropriate time,93 as well as the latest information about
transplant center procedures and transplant surgery itself so
they can fully inform their patients when making the referral.
Enforcing such a change may be difficult. For primary
kidney recipients, ensuring that patients are appropriately re-
ferred may be accomplished easily because they are routinely
seen at dialysis centers where other health care practitioners
could serve as a check. For patients with extrarenal (other than
kidney) organ failure, enforcement may not be as easy. One
option is to hold these physicians legally liable for failing to
make the referral;94 but realistically, those patients not re-
ferred, or their family members, may not have the knowledge
or resources to pursue a malpractice claim. Another option
would be to subject physicians not making referrals to disci-
plinary action. Because medical judgment would not be a de-
fense in this case, this may serve as a reasonable incentive for
physicians to comply with the referral requirement. However,
this again may not be completely effective because complaints
about the physician would have to be made before an investi-
gation occurred and the particular patient involved may not
know he or she has a legitimate complaint.
It is arguable that the best way to enforce these changes is
to educate patients about their rights. Although difficult, this
may be accomplished by enhancing public information about
organ transplantation. For example, public education could be
improved by encouraging, or requiring, health care facilities to
expand on their disclosure of patient rights, encouraging pro-
fessional associations to publicize information about the re-
93. The timing of referrals for patients with end-stage organ failure is dependent in part
upon the organ involved. See Levenson and Olbrisch, supra note 56, at 320. For example, cardiac
transplantation is considered when the patient has no other options for survival; liver
transplantation usually is considered prior to the terminal stage of the disease; and kidney patients
are generally considered eligible when they begin dialysis. Id.
94. Currently, physicians may be held liable for falling to advise a patient of all treatment
alternatives; however, the success of such a suit may be questionable as the physician's medical
judgment may not be viewed as unreasonable. There is no guarantee that the patient will definitely
receive the organ even if referred, and "many physicians still consider transplantation to be
outside of the realm of standard practice." Overcast, supra note 79, at 63-64.
19961
HEALTH MATRIX
sponsibilities of its members, having third-party payers provide
educational information to their members, and reinforcing the
need overall for members of all health professions to partici-
pate in increasing patient education.
This proposal further involves two major changes that
would take place during the second stage of the process, which
occur after referral to the transplant center. The first change
would be the establishment of uniform guidelines for assessing
a patient's ability to comply with treatment. To both achieve
uniformity and provide an incentive for transplant centers to
comply, it is recommended that these guidelines be incorporat-
ed into UNOS regulations for OPTN members. The second
change involves putting these guidelines to use.
Initially, as a part of these guidelines, the entire evaluation
process should be explained to the patient and consent should
be obtained whenever applicable. This explanation should
include a review of medical records and a discussion with
other practitioners caring for the patient.95 The patient should
be encouraged at this point to share what he or she may con-
sider any potential problems that may need to be addressed.
Every patient referred to the transplant center would also un-
dergo a mental health evaluation by a mental health profession-
al to determine his or her general mental health, intellectual
capacity, and ability to understand both the illness and the
commitment required of a transplant recipient. For patients
with a history of a mental health disorder or other current
mental health problems, this is particularly important because
mental illness has been definitively identified as a reason for
patient noncompliance.96 Other members of the transplant
team then would review each patient's medical record, commu-
nicate with other health care practitioners involved with the
patient, and interview the patient and members of his or her
support system, if any, to address any other pertinent consider-
ations. The purpose of this evaluation is to determine if com-
pliance with treatment has been a problem for the patient in the
95. The patient should be informed that a review of his or her past medical history is a
necessary part of the evaluation process and that refusal to consent to such a review would remove
the patient from consideration for a transplant.
96. Rovelli et aL, supra note 17, at 833.
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past or if there are factors in the patient's life that might affect
his or her ability to comply with post-transplant treatment.
Ideally, many of these problems can and should be identified
by the patient's private physician, and efforts to deal with them
already should be underway. Realistically, however, that may
not be the case.
After completing the initial evaluation, the transplant team
should get together to discuss the collective findings. The team
then must decide, assuming the patient otherwise qualifies,
whether compliance has been or may be a problem for the
patient if a transplant is performed. The presumption is that no
problems with compliance exist, and the transplant team has
the burden of proving that the patient would be a compliance
risk if given a transplant. If the team determines that no poten-
tial problems with compliance exist, no further assessment
would be necessary. If, however, a history of noncompliance or
other factors affecting the patient's ability to comply were
identified clearly, then a second, independent evaluation of the
patient's problem areas should immediately be arranged. For
example, if the patient's mental health evaluation resulted in
questions about the patient's compliance, another mental health
professional should be consulted for a second opinion."
At this point, the patient should be fully informed of the
transplant team's findings, concerns, and any need for addi-
tional follow-up. The patient also should be informed of the
process by which this decision can be appealed. The patient
may either independently seek out evaluation at another trans-
plant center or formally appeal the decision to UNOS, who
would then arrange for evaluation at another transplant center
at no cost to the patient.9" If the patient is found to be a suit-
97. In the Virginia Study, the researchers discovered that a substantial number of the
responding centers sometimes or never obtained second opinions when an adverse decision
regarding a patient was made. See Levenson & Olbrisch, supra note 56, at 317, Table 2.
Specifically, 28.2% of cardiac transplant programs, 35.0% of liver transplant programs, and
34.8% of kidney transplant programs stated that they obtain a second opinion only sometimes. Id.
The factors taken into consideration when determining whether a second opinion would be
obtained were not discussed. Second opinions were never obtained by 20.5% of cardiac programs,
7.5% of liver programs, and 80% of kidney programs. Id. Although this Note is limited to a
discussion of patient compliance, it is recommended that second opinions be obtained whenever
adverse decisions regarding a patient are made.
98. This appeal would simply entail a written description of the reasons for the patient's
disagreement with the decision. It is not an adjudicatory proceeding, and no formal hearings
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able candidate at the second transplant center, he or she then
would be listed at that center. If, however, the second center's
findings were the same, the patient could choose to either
continue to seek evaluation at additional centers at his or her
expense or be bound by the decision. In addition to arranging
for another evaluation, UNOS also would conduct an investiga-
tion of the patient's initial evaluation to ensure that the center
adequately complied with the guidelines."
Assuming that the decision was not appealed, patients
requiring additional follow-up would be placed on a secondary
waiting list. This indicates that they are still considered poten-
tial candidates for transplantation, but that they will not be
eligible for actual transplant surgery until these problems are
resolved."° Re-evaluation by the transplant team would de-
pend on the nature of the problem and the steps required to
resolve it, and such re-evaluation should occur within six
months. If, upon re-evaluation, the patient's compliance is
determined no longer to be a problem, he or she would imme-
diately be placed on the primary transplant waiting list in the
position he or she would have originally assumed.' ° If, after
one year, the patient is still identified as a compliance risk, the
patient would be removed from the secondary transplant list.
Patients removed from the transplant list would be referred to
the appropriate social service agency or other support service at
that time to help them work on the problems identified. Re-
moval from the secondary list would not bar the patient from
being re-evaluated, but the patient would be limited to re-eval-
uation every three months and would not be eligible for sec-
ondary list placement again.
For patients placed on the secondary list, the focus would
be on determining the reasons behind the patient's history of
would be held. The patient may elect to seek out attorney assistance in the preparation of the
written appeal, but it is not required and would be at the patient's expense.
99. UNOS' investigation would be limited to determining compliance with the guidelines,
such as ensuring that second opinions were obtained, and would not involve judgments based
upon the assessment made or conclusions reached by the transplant center's team members.
100. This would enable the patient to benefit from time spent on the waiting list, under the
UNOS point system, while at the same time ensuring that the patient is, in fact, a suitable
candidate for surgery.
101. This assumes, of course, that the patient was otherwise determined to be medically
eligible for a transplant.
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noncompliance or the behaviors determined to affect that
patient's ability to comply with post-transplant treatment. The
goal of this step is to correct these problems and thereby en-
able the patient to become eligible for a transplant. For exam-
ple, if a patient's history of noncompliance was found to be the
result of financial difficulties, efforts to provide the patient
with the necessary funding or advice about budgeting for the
added expenses could be undertaken. If a history of substance
abuse is the patient's problem, a three-to-six-month history of
sobriety, active participation in a treatment program, and a
negative blood alcohol test or drug screen would be sufficient
to render the candidate suitable."° Those patients not meeting
such criteria would be referred to the appropriate rehabilitation
program. For patients whose problems were related to a lack of
understanding of their illness or the importance of post-opera-
tive treatment, aggressive education to increase the patient's
level of understanding would be the recommended course of
action."'
Under this proposal, there would be no changes that would
take place during the third stage of the process, which involves
the selection of a recipient when an organ becomes available.
The only difference from the current system is that UNOS
involvement would take place earlier in the process. This earli-
er involvement of UNOS would include incorporating these
guidelines into its regulations and making referrals and con-
ducting investigations for patients appealing the decisions of
102. This is currently the criteria used by one local transplant center. Levine Interview,
supra note 41. The required length of abstinence is a controversial topic which has undergone
several changes. For example, there are other programs that have defined different prognosis
scales for patients with alcoholism in need of a liver transplant. See, e.g., Emmet B. Keeffe &
Carlos 0. Esquivel, Controversies in Patient Selection for Liver Transplantation, WJ. MED. 586,
587-88 (1993).
103. The author recommends aggressive education of all patients and their significant others
during the evaluation process, with such education to include introduction to a patient who has
previously undergone the same transplant surgery for which this patient is being considered.
According to a clinical nurse specialist with a local transplant program, a lack of proper patient
education is one of the main problems with transplant patients post-operatively and significantly
contributes to noncompliance. Stokes Interview, supra note 92. See also Bittar et al., supra note
13, at 2721 (encouraging the identification of and a more personal approach to patients at risk for
noncompliance); Schweizer, supra note 13, at 376 (recommending good communication between
patient and physician to help facilitate treatment compliance); Betty C. Irwin, The Role of the
Nursing Professional in Organ Transplantation, in HUMAN ORGAN TRANSPLANTATION, supra
note 79, at 99-102 (discussing the role of nursing in the case of organ transplant recipients).
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individual transplant centers.
V. EXAMINING THE ARGUMENTS SURROUNDING
THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PROPOSED
CHANGE
A. Discrimination Based on Social Worth, Race,
Socioeconomic Status, and Disability
Opposing View
Opponents of this proposal will argue that denying patients
access to organ transplants on the basis of psychosocial criteria
is treading dangerously close to basing selection on social
worth.'O° Determining a person's social worth or value in-
volves the "consideration of a variety of factors, including
income, net worth, educational background, community service,
and occupation."' 5 In short, "[s]ocial value does not measure
the goodness of persons but merely how useful they are to so-
ciety."'' "° The use of social worth in selection of organ trans-
plant recipients has been uniformly rejected by practitioners
and commentators alike. 7
Opponents will argue that, under this proposal, the poten-
tial for individual biases and prejudices is not removed. Even
though the decisions would be made by a transplant team, as
opposed to individual practitioners, the team's findings would
likely be the result of a compilation of individual team
104. See Developments in the Law, supra note 19, at 1636-37 (discussing the detrimental
consequences of selection based upon social characteristics).
105. JoHN F. KILNER, WHO LIVES? WHO DIES?: ETmCAL CRITERmA IN PATIENT SELEcTION
27(1990).
106. Id.
107. In the early 1970s, kidney dialysis machines were scarce and rationing was necessary.
As an example of social worth selection, a Native American named Ernie Crowfeather was denied
dialysis because he did not measure up to the social worth criteria established by a committee of
Seattle citizens, who had been given the responsibility for choosing the "most appropriate"
candidates for dialysis. NANCY NEvELoFF DUBLER & DAvID NIMMONS, ETHICS ON CALL A
MEDICAL ETHIClST SHOWS How TO TAKE CHARGE OF LIFE-AND-DEATH CHOICES, 315-18
(1992). After Crowfeather's story was publicized, the medical and ethics communities rejected the
social worth criterion as an ethically acceptable method for allocating scarce medical resources.
Id. at 318.
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members' views. The biases or prejudices of any one individu-
al team member could affect the entire team's decision and
potentially result in denying the patient what might be life-
saving treatment. For example, if a mentally challenged patient
were found to be at risk for noncompliance by the person con-
ducting his or her mental health evaluation, that assessment
may be based upon a legitimate concern about compliance, or
it may represent a judgment about giving a scarce organ to a
mentally challenged person.
Similarly, opponents may argue that discrimination against
minorities and the poor, even if not intended, is likely to result
from the implementation of this proposal."8 Those with mon-
ey and resources are more likely to be found suitable recipients
because they have the financial means to comply with treat-
ment. In contrast, minorities and the poor are plagued with
problems such as financial difficulties, insufficient education,
and less stable support systems, all of which may have affected
their ability to comply with treatment in the past and/or result
in the perception that future compliance might be a problem.
This is especially problematic for African Americans who are
already at a disadvantage for kidney transplants because of the
emphasis on antigen matching and the marked
underrepresentation of African Americans in the cadaveric
donor pool."°
Furthermore, it is arguable that the exclusion, or otherwise
different treatment, of patients labelled as noncompliant would
constitute violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act of
1990 (ADA)."' Prior to the enactment of the ADA, the treat-
ment of noncompliant patients was accepted as that defined by
the court in Payton v. Weaver."' In Payton, the court held
that neither the physician nor the hospital defendants were
required to provide further dialysis treatment to the plaintiff
because the plaintiff was noncompliant, abusive, and engaged
108. Developments in the Law, supra note 19, at 1636-37.
109. Ayres et al., supra note 71, at 808, 822. Because African Americans tend to have
different antigens than whites, a predominantly white donor pool limits the availability of
cadaveric kidneys to African Americans. Id. at 822.
110. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1994) (providing protection and legal remedies for
disabled individuals who have been discriminated against).
111. 182 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1982).
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in behavior which affected the care provided to other pa-
tients.112 Further, the court held that the physician had provid-
ed sufficient notice of his desire to end the relationship, as well
as ample time for the patient to find another treating physician,
thereby relieving the defendant physician of all obligations
imposed by the physician-patient relationship."3
With the passage of the ADA, however, it is not clear that
the outcome of the Payton case would be the same.114 Gener-
ally, the ADA was passed in part "to provide a clear and com-
prehensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimina-
tion against individuals with disabilities. '1 . The ADA adopts
the definition of disability as is written in the Rehabilitation
Act,'1 6 and thereby defines it in pertinent part as "a physical
or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of
the major life activities of such individual."'17 Subchapter III
of the ADA clearly includes the provision of services by a
hospital or health care provider within the scope of the
Act."' Although there is no case law which specifically ad-
dresses this issue, it is arguable that, under the provisions of
the ADA, denying a patient access to a transplant because of
established or predicted noncompliance due to a disability, as
defined in the Act, would constitute a violation of the Act.19
112. Id. at 228-29.
113. Id.
114. See David Orentlicher, Denying Treatment to the Noncompliant Patient, 265 JAMA
1579, 1580 (1991) (proposing that Payton could be decided differently today because the plaintiff
now could argue that denial of further dialysis constitutes discrimination on the basis of a
psychological disorder under the ADA).
115. 42U.S.C.§ 12101(b)(1) (1994).
116. 29 U.S.C. § 706(8)(B) (West Supp. 1997) (defining the term "individual with a dis-
ability," for purposes of the Rehabilitation Act, as "any person who (i) has a physical or mental
impairment which substantially limits one or more of such person's major life activities, (ii) has a
record of such an impairment, or (iii) is regarded as having such an impairment").
117. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A).
118. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12181(7)(F), 12182(a) (defining public accommodation to include hos-
pitals and professional offices of health care providers and further prohibiting discrimination on
the basis of disability by public accommodations).
119. Orentlicher, supra note 114 (proposing that, if a patient's noncompliance reflects
psychiatric dysfunction, then a further denial of treatment may be prohibited under the ADA as
discrimination based on a psychological disorder).
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Response
In support of this proposal, to make any system of organ
distribution work, it first must be recognized that "there are no
value-neutral selection criteria that could permit bypassing the
need to make ethical judgments in the recipient selection pro-
cess."
120
One of the first and most basic advantages of this proposal
is that it gives priority to those patients who demonstrate a
willingness and ability to comply with post-transplant treat-
ment. This is commensurate with the goals of transplantation
- the ability of a patient to benefit from the transplant and the
likelihood of a successful outcome. These goals are the basis
for the medical criteria currently used to identify organ trans-
plant recipients. It is generally accepted that patients excluded
from organ transplants on the grounds of medical efficacy are
not treated unfairly, and the recommendations under this pro-
posal simply broaden what is considered medically efficacious.
This point has been well-articulated in a report on transplanta-
tion by the New York State Task Force on Life and the Law:
Failure to comply with post-operative treatment, including the
rigorous drug regimen, makes the transplant futile-it results in
graft rejection, and, in the case of heart and liver recipients, the
patient's death unless another organ is implanted. Hence, psy-
chosocial criteria, used to assess the patient's willingness and
ability to comply with treatment protocols, are closely related to
an evaluation of medical benefit and outcome.'
Further, the fear of prejudice and inappropriate social
value judgments, such as discrimination on the basis of race or
socioeconomic status, occurring under this proposal is unfound-
ed. Race does not come into play under the recommended
changes. Its role and the role of other social characteristics,
120. Brock, supra note 34, at 88.
121. Developments in the Law, supra note 19, at 1633, n.128 (quoting NEW YORK STATE
TASK FORCE ON LiFE AND THE LAW, TRANSPLANTATION IN NEW YORK STATE: THE
PROCUREMENT AND DISTRIBUTION OF ORGANS AND TISSUES 110-11 (1988)). See also TOM L.
BEAUCHAMP & JAMES F. CIUDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL ETMIcs 294 (3d ed. 1989).
"[The criterion of [the] likelihood of success is relevant because a scarce medical resource should
only be distributed to patients who have a reasonable chance of benefitting from it. Ignoring this
factor would be unjust, because it would result in a waste of resources, as in the case of organs
that can be transplanted only once:' Id.
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such as lifestyle, social support systems, and alcoholism will
only be a factor in the assessment if the medical outcome was
or will be detrimentally affected. There is a "mistaken belief
that in order to avoid the use of certain kinds of value judg-
ments that seem ethically unjustified, one must avoid all value
judgments. But this is not necessary - nor is it even possi-
ble."" While it is true that using factors such as financial
status in evaluating organ recipients could be construed as an
assessment of one's social worth, it is crucial to determine why
such a factor is being used."2 "If [u]sed because it positively
affects the probability of successful patient and graft survival,
and if there is adequate evidence that it in fact does so, it is
ethically unproblematic."" Therefore, because patient com-
pliance is essential to the success of the transplant and, in
some instances, to the survival of the patient, the consideration
of a patient's ability to comply and the factors potentially
affecting it are justifiable.
In addition, this proposal incorporates several safeguards
designed to prevent the occurrence of such discrimination. The
requirement of second opinions, for example, significantly
decreases the likelihood of individual biases or prejudices
coming into play. Similarly, the patient's right to appeal the
decision and obtain an entirely independent evaluation will
likewise remove the danger of discriminatory practices.
It is also unlikely that this proposal will result in viola-
tions of the ADA. First, not all patients affected by this pro-
posal have a disability as defined in the Act."z For example,
those currently engaged in the use of illegal drugs are not
considered disabled under the ADA."2 Such patients are
treated in the same manner as those identified as noncomplia-
nce risks because of a disability. Second, those patients ex-
cluded from consideration for a transplant who do fall within
the given disability definition are not removed from such con-
sideration on the basis of their disability, which a violation of
122. Brock, supra note 34, at 89.
123. Id. at 89-90.
124. Id. at90.
125. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (defining the term disability for purposes of the ADA).
126. Id. § 12210(a).
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the ADA would require. 27 Rather, the effects which the dis-
ability has on the medical efficacy of a transplant are the rea-
sons for the possible exclusion.1" Third, even if this is con-
sidered discrimination on the basis of a disability, this proposal
clearly provides reasonable modifications to minimize any such
discrimination,129 and the criteria as established in the propos-
al are necessary for ensuring the success of the transplants and
the likelihood of patients to benefit from them. 30 Any further
steps, such as no consideration of patient compliance, would
completely undermine the goals of transplantation and poten-
tially affect the many compliant patients who are awaiting
transplants.
As the previous discussion indicated, it is not entirely
clear what the outcome of a case alleging a violation of the
ADA under this proposal would be. However, it is believed
that this proposal, if implemented as prescribed, would not be
inconsistent with the ADA.
Furthermore, this proposal would also bring uniformity to
the system of selecting potential organ recipients, particularly
at the stages of the process where the greatest potential for
arbitrariness and prejudice exists. As the ASTP and Virginia
Studies demonstrate, there is a significant lack of consistency
among transplant centers in how candidates are evaluated for
transplantation.' These studies have shown that some trans-
127. Id. § 12182(a) (prohibiting denial of the ability fully and equally to participate in the
"enjoyment of... goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations" on the
basis of a disability).
128. See id. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(i) (following the general prohibition against discrimination on
the basis of a disability, but allowing the use of eligibility criteria for the purpose of screening out
an individual with a disability when "such criteria can be shown to be necessary for the provision
of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations being offered").
129. Id. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii) (stating "a failure to make reasonable modifications in policies,
practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford such goods, services,
facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to individuals with disabilities..." is a
violation of the ADA "unless the entity can demonstrate that making such modifications would
fundamentally alter the nature of such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or
accommodations ... ). Examples of such reasonable modifications of this proposal include the
following: placement on a secondary list, as opposed to outright exclusion, the requirement of
second opinions; and the appeals process.
130. The criteria set forth in this proposal are not intended to screen out individuals with
disabilities, but rather may affect them just as others without disabilities are affected. These
criteria are necessary to optimize the success of transplantation and to facilitate the fair and
equitable distribution of organs.
131. This proposal does not address any legitimate differences in criteria based upon the
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plant centers have very specific policies relating to the assess-
ment of patient compliance, while others may have no such
policies at all.132 The assessment of compliance in determin-
ing the patient's likelihood of benefitting from treatment is not
new, particularly when it involves a treatment which someone
else might have to wait longer for or forgo altogether. For
example, "[m]any rehabilitation programs use psychosocial
assessments, including assessment of compliance and motiva-
tion, as a standard part of their eligibility determinations in
placing would-be patients on their waiting lists, as well as in
making decisions to terminate care." '133
Recognizing the potential problems and inequities in
which such assessments could result emphasizes the need for
uniformly established guidelines. The incorporation of these
guidelines into UNOS regulations would eliminate many of
these concerns regarding discrimination. It would, for example,
remove the potential biases now exhibited by transplant cen-
ters. For instance, "if centers are held accountable for surgical
outcome relative to a national standard, this may militate
against decisions to include marginal patients. In contrast, if
funding agencies require that centers perform a certain annual
volume, this may lead to the inclusion of poorer prognosis
recipients.' 34
Many of the existing arguments calling for uniformity also
emphasize that "[s]ignificant differences between transplant
centers in psychosocial criteria and selection rates may encour-
age patients to shop around .... Adherence to at least some
agreed-upon psychosocial criteria by all transplant centers
would optimize fairness in the allocation of scarce donor or-
gans."'35 This would eliminate the advantages realized by
organ being transplanted. Rather, the call for uniformity is that programs providing the same
services should have the same set of guidelines for assessing patient compliance.
132. See Ramos et al., supra note 46, at 493; Levenson & Olbrisch, supra note 56, at 319.
See also supra Table 3 (presenting the weight assigned to various psychological contraindications
to transplant).
133. Arthur L. Caplan, Ethics of Casting the First Stone: PersonalResponsibility, Rationing,
and Transplants, 18 ALCOHOLISM: CLINICAL AND EXPERIMENTAL RES. 219, 219 (1994)
(discussing the importance of personal responsibility for one's health and its role in both
preventing the need for organ transplants and in contributing to transplant failure).
134. Owen S. Surman & Ruth Purtilo, Reevaluation of Organ Transplantation Criteria:
Allocation of Scarce Resources to Borderline Candidates, 33 PsYcHoSOMATICS 202, 211 (1992).
135. Levenson & Olbrisch, supra note 56, at 322. See also Robertson, supra note 81, at
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those having the knowledge and resources to seek out evalua-
tions at multiple transplant centers over those who, lacking
these resources, may be lucky to be listed at even one trans-
plant center.'36 "Although there are sound reasons for some
of the variations ... that exist, their existence gives the public
the impression that pettiness or arrogance of providers can be
decisive in determining who does and does not gain admission
to a [transplant] program."'37
This leads to yet another issue that must be considered:
public perceptions of fairness in selecting organ transplant re-
cipients. Public support of transplantation is essential for two
reasons. Currently the public is the only source of organs, and
they, both directly and indirectly, also provide the necessary
funding for the provision of transplant-related services.138 Ac-
cording to Caplan, "[i]f the public does not believe the process
by which organs are allocated to be fair, they will not support
either the procurement of organs on a voluntary, altruistic basis
or the continuing commitment of public and private funds to
pay for transplants."'39
In 1994, three telephone surveys were conducted for
UNOS by an independent research firm."4 The surveys fo-
cused on the attitudes of the following groups: adult Ameri-
cans, representing the general consumer group; candidates
waiting for a kidney, liver, heart, or lung transplant; and organ
3402 (concluding that a representative body should set the criteria for determining which patients
will receive organs).
136. James F. Childress, Ethical Criteria for Procuring and Distributing Organs for
Transplantation, 14 J. HEALTH POL., POL'Y & L. 87, 107-08 (1989). See A.P. Monaco, Comment:
A Transplant Surgeon's Views on Social Factors in Organ Transplantation, 21
TRAN PLANTATION PROC. 3403, 3405 (1989) (discussing the ability of the wealthy to gain greater
access to the transplantation process); A.L. Caplan, Problems in the Policies and Criteria Used to
Allocate Organs for Transplantation in the United States, 21 TRANSPLANTATION PROC. 3381,
3384 (1989) [hereinafter Caplan, PROBLEMS] (stressing that there needs to be equity and uniformi-
ty in the allocation of organs).
137. Caplan, PROBLEMS, supra note 136, at 3384.
138. Id.at3381.
139. Id. at 3387. See also Moss & Siegler, supra note 64, at 1296-97 (arguing that alcoholics
should receive lower priority for liver transplants because of the effect on public support of
transplantation); BEAucHAw & CHILDRESS, supra note 121, at 296 (stating that public
confidence in morally acceptable and fairly applied criteria is essential to the organ donation
system).
140. SouHEAsTERN INST. OF RES., INC., RESEARCH REPORT. PATIENTS AND THE
POPULOUS: AMERICAN ATITUDEs TOWARD THE ALLOCATION OF ORGANS IN TRANSPLANTATION
1 (1994) (on file with author).
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recipients who already had received a kidney, liver, heart, or
lung. '4 Among the findings these surveys yielded was that
"[t]here is no clear consensus within any of the three groups as
to an organ allocation policy."'42 Other findings of interest
include the fact that a majority of respondents overall agree
that the organs available for transplantation are distributed
fairly. 43 For the candidates and recipients, those agreeing that
there was a fair distribution constituted at least two-thirds of
the respondents in each group, while, in the consumer group,
not even a majority agreed that the distribution system is
fair.'" In each of the three surveys, more of the disagreement
about the fairness of the current allocation system was ex-
pressed by minorities. 45
One final point of interest is the priorities these groups
would assign in the allocation of organs. With each survey, the
two highest priorities, given in order, would be assigned to
"the patient who is the most critically ill" and "the patient who
has the best chance of surviving the operation and retaining the
organ. ,, 4
Arguably, the public support of such a proposal could go
either way. If the public felt that denial of a transplant based
upon predictions about a patient's ability to comply with treat-
ment was too speculative or otherwise unfair, public support
could suffer. 47 However, if the public believed that this pro-
posal represented necessary steps that must be taken in light of
the scarcity of organs, it may improve the public's support and
faith in the distribution of organs for transplantation.
The opposition's arguments regarding discrimination based
on social worth, race, socioeconomic status, and disability are
significant, but they ultimately must fail. Although the use of
psychosocial factors and the assessment of patient compliance
is potentially discriminatory, its use under these circumstances
141. Id.
142. Id. at5.
143. Id. at 6-7,15.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 10.
146. Id. at 16, 19,23.
147. See, e.g., Carl Cohen & Martin Benjamin, Alcoholics and Liver Transplantation, 265
JAMA 1299 (1991) (arguing that alcoholics should not be categorically precluded from receiving
liver transplants simply because the public might react negatively if they are included).
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is justified. If the proposal is implemented as prescribed, the
risk of misuse is effectively eliminated.
B. Constitutional SafeguardsOpposing View
A related concern is that the constitutional safeguards
against such discrimination, such as those provided by the due
process and equal protection clauses, may not apply to the
distribution of cadaveric organs. Because these clauses only
protect individuals against state action, which is conduct by the
government, the necessary element of state action would be
missing and patients would have no recourse against such
discrimination." For example, in Blum v. Yaretsky, 49 a
class of Medicaid patients challenged decisions made by the
nursing homes in which they resided to discharge or transfer
patients without notice or an opportunity for a hearing."5 The
plaintiffs claimed that the extensive regulation of nursing
homes in New York State converted this to action by the State
for the purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment."' The Su-
preme Court of the United States rejected that argument hold-
ing that "[t]he complaining party must.., show that 'there is
a sufficiently close nexus between the State and the challenged
action of the regulated entity so that the action of the latter
may be fairly treated as that of the State itself."'"5 2 This rais-
es the understandable concern that UNOS may not be found to
be a state actor; thereby, removing any constitutional safe-
guards these patients might otherwise enjoy.
Response
UNOS involvement at all stages of the process may an-
swer the concerns about the lack of constitutional protection
instead of raising additional concerns about it. The "nexus
between the federal government and UNOS might seem suffi-
cient to implicate the federal government in UNOS decision
148. Developments in the Law, supra note 19, at 1637.
149. 457 U.S. 991 (1982).
150. Id. at 993.
151. Id. at 1003.
152. Id. at 1004.
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making, making UNOS a de facto state actor."'' 3 For exam-
ple, in Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority," an African
American sued a restaurant located in a publicly owned park-
ing building for failure to serve him.' Because the restaurant
was located in a publicly owned building that was maintained
with public funds and the parking service was owned and oper-
ated by an agency of the state, the state was held liable for
violating the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.156 It is quite possible that the argument would
be even stronger in the case of UNOS because "It]he federal
government further implicates itself in UNOS decisions by pro-
viding the enforcement mechanism for UNOS policies - fed-
eral Medicare and Medicaid eligibility."' 7 Therefore, it is be-
lieved that, with the implementation of this proposal and the
involvement of UNOS at all stages of the process, patients
would be afforded the constitutional protection of the due
process clause.
As for the equal protection concern, patients in need of a
transplant who are noncompliant are not the same or equal to
those who are compliant. In City of Cleburne, Texas v.
Cleburne Living Center,' the Supreme Court of the United
States held "that all persons similarly situated should be treated
alike."'59 Because compliant and noncompliant candidates for
a transplant are not similarly situated, there is no equal protec-
tion issue.
153. Developments in the Law, supra note 19, at 1638. See also Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S.
at 1004 (holding that a sufficiently close nexus must exist between the State and the regulated
entity to attribute the regulated entity's action to the State for purposes of the Fourteenth
Amendment).
154. 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
155. Id. at 716.
156. Id. at 716-17.
157. Developments in the Law, supra note 19, at 1638.
158. 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
159. Id. at 439.
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C. Punishment
Opposing View
Opponents of this proposal will argue that its implementa-
tion will, in effect, punish people for behavior that may not be
within their control. By even putting patients on notice that
compliance is essential to being considered for a transplant, it
seems unfair and impossible to require compliance or deter-
rence of a specific behavior when that behavior may not be
voluntary. As one commentator points out, "it is hard to find a
lifestyle 'choice' or a health condition that is not, at least in
part, a consequence of genetics, family environment, social
environment, gender, life trauma, ethnicity, community, educa-
tion.., and, probably, most significantly, wealth."'' Al-
though this commentator acknowledges that there may be some
voluntary elements to a. patient's conduct that potentially affect
the patient's ability to comply, the commentator claims that
"[m]ost life style choices... are the consequences of a variety
of factors, and most commonly we do not know the signifi-
cance of the different factors." 6' The most often cited condi-
tion or life style "choice" to which this argument applies is
alcoholism. While the choice to take a drink appears to be
voluntary, alcoholism is a product of several forces including
genetics, social factors, and familial patterns. 62 In spite of
these involuntary components of the disease, opponents will
claim that this proposal recommends that patients suffering
from alcoholism be treated differently than those whose condi-
tions are unrelated to alcohol because an alcoholic does not
have the same chance of controlling his behavior to reduce the
risk of noncompliance.'63 Opponents will argue that this pro-
posal, and others like it, fails to consider all the factors af-
fecting a patient's ability to comply with treatment, and that
160. Robert L. Schwartz, Life Style, Health Status, and Distributive Justice, 3 HEALTH
MATRIX 195,204 (1993).
161. Id. at205.
162. Id. at 204.
163. See, e.g., Moss & Siegler, supra note 64, at 1296-98 (recommending that patients with
alcohol-related end-stage liver disease be given lower priority for liver transplants than those
patients with non-alcohol-related liver disease).
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the patient may be powerless to change such factors. Indeed,
even assuming a patient is able to control his or her noncom-
pliance, does that justify the denial of what may be a life-sav-
ing organ? 16
Opponents also will likely make the following slippery
slope argument: if organs are rationed on the basis of a
patient's behavior or his or her role in the illness, then this
may lead to the rationing of health care overall. If it does, few
of us would be legitimately eligible for health care."6 Exam-
ples of patients having at least some small role in their illness
include firefighters injured in the line of duty, motorcyclists
with head injuries due to not wearing helmets, professional ath-
letes injured while competing, and downhill skiers sustaining
injuries while on the slopes. All of these patients, arguably,
were on notice of the potential consequences of their actions.
Currently, there is no indication that anyone believes such pa-
tients should be denied access to the care they need, yet if we
start rationing organs on the basis of a patient's behavior,
would this not be the next logical step? In the interest of fair-
ness to end-stage organ failure patients who are denied access
to transplantation, should we not treat others the same? One
commentator writes on this issue in the context of alcoholics'
eligibility for liver transplants. He states:
If alcoholics should be penalized because of their moral fault,
then all others who are equally at fault in causing their own
medical needs should be similarly penalized. To accomplish
this, we would have to make vigorous and sustained efforts to
find out whose conduct has been morally weak or sinful and to
what degree. That inquiry, as a condition for medical care or
for the receipt of goods in short supply, we certainly will not
and should not undertake.166
164. See Schwartz, supra note 160, at 211 (discussing problems associated with using the
denial of available health care as a punishment for behavior); Cohen & Benjamin, supra note 147,
at 1299-1301 (arguing against the conclusion that alcoholics' personal failings should be
considered in determining entitlement to scarce resources).
165. For an excellent discussion of this argument, see Schwartz, supra note 160, at 198-202
(discussing the range of lifestyle choices and their consequences on healthy status).
166. Cohen & Benjamin, supra note 147, at 1300. Cf. Robertson, supra note 81, at 3400
(suggesting that an allocation scheme which punishes patients for previous behavior may be just
only if the patient was clearly culpable and on notice as to the consequences, but further stating
that such criteria ultimately may be unacceptable).
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Opponents also also argue that, with the exception of re-
transplant patients and their histories of noncompliance, there
is no definitive way for predicting a patient's noncompliance
with post-transplant treatment. This proposal assumes that if
there is evidence of noncompliance in the patient's history, he
or she will continue to be noncompliant in the future when, in
fact, that may not be the case." This is even more problem-
atic for those patients who do not necessarily have a history of
noncompliance, but whose life circumstances may raise con-
cerns about their ability to comply with treatment.
This situation bears a striking resemblance to the selective
incapacitation of criminals which has gained attention in recent
years. With selective incapacitation, "some [criminal] offenders
would be imprisoned for a longer period than others convicted
of the same offense, because of predictions about their future
criminality."'" Among the major objections to selective inca-
pacitation are "1) it is unfair to punish people for crimes they
have not yet committed, and might not commit if released;
[and] 2) it is unjust to incarcerate (or further incarcerate) peo-
ple on the basis of predictions of future crimes because those
predictions are too often wrong." '169 Like selective incapacita-
tion, speculating about the future compliance of organ trans-
plant patients is unfair and cannot be justified.
Response
This proposal does not constitute any form of punishment.
Under this proposal, patients would not be flatly rejected for a
transplant. Instead, unlike the current system of distribution,
patients will be assisted in dealing with whatever problems
may affect their ability to comply with the post-transplant
regimen. 7 This proposal is designed to encourage compli-
167. See Levine Interview, supra note 41. Ms. Levine claims that many transplant patients
view the receipt of an organ as a new lease on life and do everything within their power to make it
work.
168. SANFORD H. KADISH & STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES:
CASES AND MATERILS 162 (5th ed. 1989).
169. Id.
170. See Levenson & Olbrisch, supra note 56, at 322 (stating that the current system
encourages "patients to shop around rather than work on correcting psychosocial con-
traindications to transplantation"); BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 121, at 296 (suggesting
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ance, or deter behaviors affecting compliance, that are within
the patient's power to control. Recognizing that factors affect-
ing compliance are not necessarily voluntary, placement on the
secondary list involves determining the causes of noncompli-
ance, providing the patient with the means for dealing with
those causes, and assisting him or her in any other way possi-
ble. For alcoholics, this may mean enrollment in Alcoholics
Anonymous or another substance abuse rehabilitation program.
For patients with financial difficulties, this may include
working with government agencies to get the patient the neces-
sary resources that would enable compliance with treatment or,
if applicable, employment assistance.
For those behaviors that are within the patient's control,
placement on the secondary list is notice that further consider-
ation for a transplant is dependent upon that patient doing
whatever he or she can to correct such problems.' This line
of thinking is similiar to that encountered in our everyday
lives. In many facets of our lives we encounter benefits that
are conditioned upon our compliance with specific terms. For
example, insurance policies often require the insured to comply
with specifications in the policy or to abstain from certain
behaviors before a claim will be paid. Car warranties cover
certain parts or problems provided that the owner has complied
with the maintenance requirements outlined in the owner's
manual. This idea is not new to our legal system, either. The
recent concept of "three strikes and you're out," in which
felons convicted of a third felony are sentenced to life in pris-
on, puts these persons effectively on notice of the consequenc-
es of continued violations of the law. Even something as sim-
ple as a speeding ticket fits into this picture. Drivers are on
notice of speed limits and the consequences of failing to com-
ply with them. If they choose not to comply, they receive a
speeding ticket.
that justice requires society to seek alternatives for patients rather than excluding them from
transplantation).
171. This is in contrast to the current system in which patients often are not told of the
reasons they are being refused for placement on the waiting list, or are merely told they are
"medically unsuitable" for consideration. See Levenson & Olbrisch, supra note 56, at 317, Table
2 (presenting the inconsistencies, as reported by responding centers, in which potential patients
are given a reason for their rejection).
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A similar concept has recently come into play in the medi-
cal field as well. In the last decade, physicians and other care
providers have refused to render treatment to patients on the
basis of futility.172 Although these patients are usually termi-
nally ill, the main idea behind the concept is that the benefits
of continuing treatment are negligible or futile, while the bur-
dens of treatment are substantial.173
The necessity of compliance in transplant patients has
been established. Giving an organ to a patient unable or un-
willing to comply with treatment is futile. 74 As the above
analysis suggests, the benefits of such a transplant would be
negligible, while the burdens would be very substantial. This
patient would undergo major surgery and the routine post-oper-
ative course only to sustain what may be a fatal bout with
rejection. Additionally, another patient will have been adverse-
ly affected because he or she was deprived of an organ.
The scarcity of these organs and the need to make difficult
decisions are what makes transplantation different from other
areas of health care, thereby making the slippery slope argu-
ment less of a concern. If there were enough organs to match
the number of those in need, allocation decisions would not be
an issue. Just as we care for the firefighters, motorcyclists,
professional athletes, and skiers without question, all patients in
need would be given organs. This is not the reality, however,
and each year patients are dying as a result of the scarcity of
transplantable organs."7 The rationing of organs based on
psychosocial factors and patient compliance is not taken light-
ly, nor is it advocated unless necessary. Unfortunately, in the
case of organ distribution, it has become necessary.
The criticism with regard to predicting patient compliance
172. See REBECCA DRESSER, BIoErmcs AND LAw (forthcoming, West Publishing Co.)
(manuscript on file with author).
173. Id.
174. See Developments in the Law, supra note 19, at 1633 n.128 (discussing the necessity
for patients to comply with post-operative treatment (quoting NEw YORK STATE TASK FORCE ON
LYF AND THE LAW, TRANSPLANTATION IN NEw YORK STATE: THE PROCUREMENT AND DIs-
TRIBLnrION OF ORGANS AND TISSUES, 110-11 (1988)).
175. In the years between 1988 and 1993, the General Accounting Office estimated that over
10,000 people died while on a waiting list to receive an organ. Fentiman, supra note 79, at 43.
This number, however, does not include the thousands more who never even made it onto a
waiting list. Id.
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is compelling. However, it must be emphasized that the goals
of this proposal are to further the goals of transplantation.
Mere speculation about a patient's post-transplant compliance
would not be enough to remove a patient from consideration
for a transplant. The presumption should be that the patient
will be compliant. Only in the presence of evidence concerning
possible noncompliance would a patient be considered tempo-
rarily ineligible. The focus, then, would be on doing whatever
is possible to make that person a suitable candidate for trans-
plantation.
Although the situations may seem similar, it is inappropri-
ate to compare this proposed treatment of potential organ re-
cipients to criminals. These patients have not committed any
crime, nor does this proposal constitute a form of punishment.
In fact, under this proposal, these patients would be given the
tools they need for a successful transplant outcome. Granted,
some patients would ultimately be excluded from consideration
because of these changes, but only after painstaking efforts
have been exhausted to help them and to enable them to help
themselves.
D. Re-Transplant Patients
Opposing View
Opponents of this proposal also will argue that its treat-
ment of re-transplant patients is unfair. Implementing these
changes will result in the assumption that patients labelled as
noncompliant with their first transplant will continue to be
noncompliant with subsequent transplants. Opponents will
argue that it is impossible to determine that the rejection was
due to noncompliance when compliant patients also reject
organs. Among other things, the patient's noncompliance may
have been a result of inadequate education by health care pro-
viders after the transplant was performed.
The potential exclusion of re-transplant patients also raises
a separate host of issues. The main argument against this ex-
clusion is that it would constitute abandonment of the pa-
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tient.176 This is especially problematic for physicians who are
committed to their patients and feel a heightened duty to con-
tinue to help patients on whom they have already operated."7
The current system of organ distribution also places em-
phasis on treating patients on the basis of medical urgency. Re-
transplant patients usually are much sicker than primary trans-
plant patients."' In keeping with the general duty to help the
most urgently ill patients, re-transplant patients should not be
excluded from another transplant.179 In addition, unlike kid-
ney patients who have the alternative of dialysis if they reject
an organ, those in need of hearts and livers, for example, have
no alternative. These patients will die if denied an organ. Even
if the patient's noncompliance contributed to the rejection, it
arguably is not enough to justify denial of a life-saving
organ.
180
Response
The situation regarding re-transplant patients is different
from that of primary recipients. In addition to the documenta-
tion of the patient's prior compliance being readily available,
these are patients who have already been given a chance; and
in the interest of fairness and the need for equitable allocation,
their ability to accept the responsibility which a transplant
entails must be taken into consideration, especially since there
are so many other patients waiting for their first chance.
Allocation priorities should not be altered on the basis of ahy
special obligations that transplant teams feel to support patients
on whom they have already performed transplants. Nor does
any sense of justice support a claim that it is unfair to give pa-
tients second or third organs while others await their first.''
176. Childress, supra note 78, at 318; Brock, supra note 34, at 98-99 (discussing arguments
against the exclusion of organ recipients from receiving a second organ after a failed graft).
177. See Peter A. Ubel et al., Rationing Failure: The Ethical Lessons of the
Retransplantation of Scarce Vital Organs, 270 JAMA 2469, 2471 (1993); see also Robertson,
supra note 81, at 3401 (stating that physicians may exert aggressive efforts for a re-transplant
patient "to demonstrate committment to avoid abandonment"); Brock, supra note 34, at 99.
178. Ubel, supra note 177, at 2473.
179. Id.
180. See Schwartz, supra note 160, at 211-12 (implying that the severity of punishment for
noncompliant behavior should be in proportion to the egregiousness of the conduct).
181. Ubel, supra note 177, at2473.
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It should also be noted that, while re-transplant patients
generally are much sicker than primary transplant patients,
"[rietransplantation is an independent risk factor for poor trans-
plant outcome."'' One commentator describes why the distri-
bution of organs to re-transplant patients may not be commen-
surate with the goals of transplantation:
At any level of urgency, re-transplant recipients do not do as
well as similarly ill primary transplant recipients ... even after
controlling their preoperative status .... [T]here is no greater
duty to help one group over the other. Thus, efficacy should
determine which group has priority in receiving organs. By
giving re-transplant candidates equal access to transplantable
organs, our present policy does not do all it can to distribute
organs efficaciously. We give organs to a group of people who
have less chance of gaining long-term survival from a trans-
plant. We ignore our duty to distribute scarce resources in ways
that increase the chance that the resources will bring bene-
fit.1
83
Although some commentators would remove re-transplant
patients from consideration for another transplant altogeth-
er,"" in the interest of fairness, the recommended changes to
the current system of distribution propose that those in search
of another transplant be subject to the same compliance assess-
ment as primary recipients. The only differences that would
result in the treatment of re-transplant patients is that those
who rejected a heart or liver as a result of noncompliance
could be potentially excluded from consideration for another
transplant, whereas those awaiting their first heart or liver
would not be excluded. Because primary heart or liver trans-
plant candidates could die without ever having been given a
chance, they are the ones who should be given priority.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. See Monaco, supra note 136, at 3405 (stating that noncompliance, having resulted in a
failed first transplant, "is a valid means to reject a potential recipient for a second transplant");
Brock, supra note 34, at 99 (discussing the author's opinion that candidates who have never re-
ceived an organ transplant and who will die without the organ should be chosen over those who
have received a previously failed transplant).
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E. Cost of Implementation
Opposing View
Aside from the many ethical questions this proposal raises,
the cost of implementing it cannot be overlooked. Transplant
centers would need additional staffing to complete these evalu-
ations, handle the necessary administrative matters, and provide
the necessary follow-up for the patients on the secondary list.
UNOS also would be affected by these costs because of its in-
creased role in the process and the need to implement and
maintain the changes it would incur. Since transplantation is
directly and indirectly funded by the public, the costs of such
extensive changes would be passed along to taxpayers.
Response
There is no doubt that cost will be a factor in the imple-
mentation of this proposal. However, it is likely that these
increased costs will be covered by the monies saved as a result
of the institution of these changes. In fact, a recent study of the
economic impact of noncompliance in kidney transplant pa-
tients was conducted by researchers from the Hartford Trans-
plant Center in Hartford, Connecticut.' 5 This study specifi-
cally compared the hospital admissions of thirty patients deter-
mined to be noncompliant (using the criteria from the Compli-
ance Study discussed previously) compared with those of a
control group of thirty compliant patients whose specific char-
acteristics were matched as closely as possible."8 6 Table 4
below summarizes the findings of this study."8 7 In addition to
the findings listed in the table, fourteen of the thirty noncom-
pliant patients 'lost their kidney transplants from rejection, or died."1' 8
185. M. Swanson et al., Economic Impact of Noncompliance in Kidney Transplant Recipi-
ents, 24 TRANSPLANTATION PRoc. 2722,2722 (1992).
186. Id. These characteristics included "age, donor source, race, incidence of diabetes
mellitus, and re-transplantation" Id. Additionally, all transplants were performed within the same
two-year period (1984-86), and all patients received similar immunosuppressive medications post-
operatively. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id. (failing to state the number of compliant patients, if any, who may have lost their
kidney transplant due to rejection or who died).
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Table 4 - Economic Impact of Noncompliance in Kidney Transplants
Noncompliant Compliant
Number of readmissions 178 76
Mean length of stay upon readmission 11.3 days 8.6 days
Total readmission costs for the group $1,254,301 $442,132
(excluding the transplant itself)
Mean cost of readmissions per patient $35,602' $14,737
Mean cost of readmissions per patient $28,541 $12,885
(excluding diabetic recipients who
may have had admissions unrelated
to the transplant)
Readmissions due to complications 19 7
arising from treatment for rejection
'This total excludes the effect of two noncompliant patients with extreme numbers of admissions. Id.
Because patients with functioning kidney transplants no
longer need dialysis, the researchers also examined the savings
realized from the elimination of dialysis from the treatment
regimen for these patients. First, they determined the cost of
hemodialysis to be approximately $28,000/patient/year.8 9 The
researchers then calculated the cost of transplant maintenance
to be $10,000/patientlyear, which results in a savings of
$18,000/patient/year.' 9 Although the definitive cost of imple-
menting the changes recommmended in this proposal is not
available at this time, it appears that cost would not necessarily
be a factor because of the savings that would be realized from
the fewer hospitalizations and shorter hospital stays of giving
the organs to compliant patients.
189. Id.
190. Id.
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VI. CONCLUSION
The amount of literature addressing organ donation and
transplantation issues and the current number of patients await-
ing organs demonstrate that the scarcity of organs and selection
of recipients continue to be controversial issues. The current
process for the selection of organ recipients, described here as
a three-stage process, lacks uniformity and can be viewed as
unfair. A proposal for changing this system to include uniform
guidelines for the assessment of patient compliance is one pos-
sible alternative to the current system. Because compliance is
so important for patients receiving organs, on its face, this
seems like a legitimate solution. However, the use of psychoso-
cial factors in determining a patient's ability to comply raise a
number of ethical questions and arguments, many of which are
compelling. In addition, the fact that it is difficult to predict
patient noncompliance, particularly in primary recipients, also
must be considered. This proposal addresses these arguments
and difficulties by limiting the possible exclusion of primary
recipients to those with an alternative treatment available to
them. While all potential organ recipients should be assessed
for noncompliance, those potentially excluded as a result of
unresolved problems with noncompliance would, therefore, be
limited to kidney patients and those having undergone a prior
transplant.
The scarcity of organs available for transplantation and the
need for fairness in the distribution of these scarce resources
necessitate making difficult decisions. Although this proposal
would require making some of these difficult decisions, it is
believed that, overall, it provides a fair and legitimate solution
to an unfortunate situation and that it best serves all those
suffering from end-stage organ failure.
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